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STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of 
RONALD G. BACON, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15932 
A person under eighteen years 
of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ronald Bacon, a juvenile, was charged under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953) as amended, with the 
crime of aggravated robbery of Cheryl's Gift Shop wherein 
$120.00 was taken on or about March 10, 1978, from Terri 
Lium, an employee. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\'IER COURT 
The case was heard on June 16, 1978, before the 
Honorable Judge, John Farr Larson, Second District Juvenile 
Court for Salt Lake County, who sat without a jury and who 
reached a verdict of Guilty. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the 
trial court's decision finding appellant guilty of the 
offense charged. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of March 10, 1979, Teri Lium was 
working at Cheryl's Gift Shop at the Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center. At 7:45p.m., she noticed an individual 
(described as between 15 to 17 years old, about 5'7" or 
5'8", blonde, weighing about 150 pounds, wearing a red 
ski parka with black ski gloves, blue denim pants and 
shirt and had "rosy" sunburned cheeks), browsing through 
the s~~p. She became suspicious he might be a shoplifter 
(Tr. 4). Miss Lium had direct eye contact with the 
individual several times as she watched him (Tr. 4), and 
at one point he picked up a poster and asked her the 
cost (Tr. 4, 12, 13). 
The individual approached Miss Lium, put a 
paper sack on the counter and told her to "put all the 
money in there" (Tr. 6-9). Miss Lium testified that she 
was no more than one foot away from the individual facing 
him directly (Tr. 8). Miss Lium said "what" and he 
repeated himself (Tr. 9). 
placed the money ($120.00) 
Miss Lium testified that she 
in the paper sack. She 
-2-
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stated she was scared because the individual had 
unzipped his coat exposing a gun which was stuffed in 
his pants (Tr. 9). 
The robber then asked Miss Lium for the keys 
to the store, escorted her to the backroom, and locked 
her in (Tr. 10, ll). She escaped into the alley through 
the back door and called the police from the store 
next door. She glanced at the clock in Fernwoods and it 
was 8:15 p.m. (Tr. ll). 
Miss Lium told the officers about the poster 
the robber had handled and several prints were lifted. 
One ultimately matched appellant's right thumb print. 
(Tr. 12, 13, 30, 32). The officers instructed Miss Lium 
to go home and look through some yearbooks to see if 
she could find the robber's picture (Tr. 16). She found the 
robber's picture in the Churchill Junior High yearbook 
and phoned the police (Tr. 16). 
After Miss Lium had identified appellant's 
picture, the officers went to appellant's residence 
around midnight (R. 43). The officers asked appellant's 
mother if they could speak to him (Tr. 43), and then asked 
her if appellanL owned a red parka and she stated yes 
and retrieve~ it for them along with some black ski gloves 
(Tr. 45). 
-3-
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The officers questioned appellant about his 
whereabouts that night. Appellant denied being in 
the gift shop and told the officers he was not sure even 
what gift shop they were talking about (Tr. 46, 55, 56). 
The officers asked appellant to get the clothes he was 
wearingthatnight. Appellant went downstairs and returned 
with a denim shirt and some levis (Tr. 45, 55 69). Appellant 
was arrested and the articles of clothing were taken as 
evidence. 
At trial, Miss Lium positivelY identified 
appellant as theonewho robbed her (Tr. 3). Appellant 
admitted being at the shopping center that night but claimed 
he was home when the robbery took place (Tr. 63). When 
confronted with the fingerprint on the poster, appellant 
explained he had been in the shop two days prior on 
March 8, 1979, and handled it then (Tr. 70). It should 
be noted that appellant denied ever being in the shop 
when the officers initially questioned him (Tr. 45, 55, 56). 
Also, two fingerprint experts testified that even under 
ideal conditions, a fingerprint would probably last a 
maximum of 36 hours (Tr. 39, 60). 
Appellant's mother testified that appellant 
was home shortly after eight, when the robberywas alleged 
to have taken place (Tr. 99). She admitted that she had 
not actually looked at the time her son came in (Tr. 102). 
-4-
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She also admitted being defensive about the time because 
of its importance and that she "knew her son and there was 
no way he could do such a thing" (Tr. 103). 
Judge John Farr Larson, sitting without a 
jury, concluded that based on Miss Lium's testimony and 
the fingerprint, appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the crime of aggravated robbery (Tr. 121). The 
appellant's claim of error focuses on the sufficiency of 
the evidence presented at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUCH 
THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD 
BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT APPELLANT COMHITTED 
THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended, which 
provides: 
A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm, knife or 
a facsimile of a knife or deathly 
weapon; or 
Robbery is defined by statute as "the unlawful 
and intentional tilking of personal property in the 
possession or prcs?ncc of another person, against his will, 
-5-
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accomplished by means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-301 (1953), as amended. 
Appellant's contention is that the trial judge 
erred in finding the prosecution had proved all of the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The rules governing the scope of appellate 
review as to sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile court 
cases are well settled. In State v. Middlestadt, 579 P.2d 
908 (Utah 1978) , this Court in referring to the juvenile 
court stated: 
. that court must conform to 
practices and procedures provided for 
by law or rule of court in district 
court criminal proceediDgs. Those 
p~ocedures include a requirement that 
gu1lt must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. However, this Court will not 
overturn the judgment of the trial 
court absent a showing of error, 
prejudice, or insufficient evidence. 
The test to be applied is that the 
evidence submitted must be so im-
probable so as to make it completely 
unbelieveable such that the conviction 
could not possibly stand. 
579 P.2d at 909. 
Moreover, this Court in State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976), also said: 
This court has long upheld the 
standard that on an appeal from 
conviction the court cannot weigh 
the evidence nor say what quantum 
is necessary to establish a fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt so lonq 
-6-
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as the evidence given is substantial. 
Further, this court has maintained 
that its function is not to determine 
guilt or innocence, the weight to 
give conflicting evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight to be given defendant's 
testimony. 
554 P.2d at 218. 
Reasonable doubt is described as follows: 
"Reasonable doubt" is not a 
mere imaginary, captious, or a 
possible.doubt, but a fair doubt, 
based upon reason and common 
sense, and growing out of 
testimony in the case, and it is 
such doubt as will leave juror's 
mind, after a careful examination 
of all evidence, in such condition 
that he cannot say he has an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, 
of defendant's guilt. 
State v. Taylor, 21 U.2d 425, 446 P.2d 954 (1968). 
State v. Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) cert. 
denied 355 U.S. 848, 2 L.Ed.2d 57, 78 S.Ct. 74 (1957), 
further adds: 
. proof beyond all peradventure 
of doubt could seldom be had, nor does 
the law require it. 
Respondent submits that the evidence presented 
at trial, viewed under the above standards,is substantial 
and more than sufficient to support the verdict that 
appellant was guilty of the crime of aggravated robbery. 
-7-
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Terri Lium positively identified appellant 
and at trial stated that there was no doubt in her mind 
that appellant was the robber (Tr. 18) . Miss Limn also 
picked out appellant's picture from among hundreds (Tr. 16). 
This Court in Middlestadt, supra, ruled that, 
in general, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim 
alone may sustain a conviction even where that testimony 
conflicts in some respects. See also State v. Rasmussen, 
92 Idaho 731 449 P.2d 837 (1969), Morse v. State, 438 P.2d 
309 (Okla. 1968), Ballard v. Sup. Ct. of San Diego City, 
410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966). 
In this case, Miss Lium's testimony does not 
conflict in any respects. The only conflicts which arise 
are in the ~dentification of shirt and levis which Miss 
Liurn stated were different from the ones appellant wore 
during the robbery (Tr. 6, 7, 19 20). It is important 
to note, however, that appellant is the one who retrieved 
the clothes for the officers (Tr. 69). Miss Lium was certain, 
however, that the red parka (Exhibit 3), was worn by the 
robber. She stated she recognized the unique "slit" in 
the pockets (Tr. 3, Exhibit 3). 
The other conflict in testimony is to the 
time element. Appellant clilims he was home at the~ tir1c' 
, the robbery took place. His mother, although she did not 
look at a clock, stated that she was sure he was hoin~: at 
-8-
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that time (Tr. 102, 103). This is simply an issue of 
witness credibility. This Court in State v. Howard, 544 
P.2d 466 (Utah, 1975), in a rape case, was forced with 
only the conflicting testimony of the assailant and the 
victim. This Court stated: 
As opposed to the foregoing, 
the defendant argues some inconsistencies 
and what he considers unreasonable 
aspects of the prosecutrix's story, 
which should leave at least a reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt. The State's 
correct rejoinder to this is that 
the credibility of the witnesses was 
the exclusive prerogative of the trial 
court; and that it is neither the duty 
nor the privilege of this court to 
disagree and substitute its judgment 
thereon. 
544 P.2d ~t 168. 
Respondent points out that if the defendant's 
self-serving statements were all that was required to 
raise a reasonable doubt, successful prosecution would 
be impossible. 
The testimony of Miss Lium alone would be 
sufficjent to sustain the verdict. However, in addition, 
appellant's fingerprint was found at the scene. The Court 
in State In the interest of Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah, 
1977), held that the defendant's fingerprint found at 
the scene of tltc burglary was sufficient to sustain his 
-9-
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conviction. In that case, the dcfend~nt was unknown to 
the victim and offered no explanation as to why the 
fingerprint was there. 
In this case, ap}ellant was unknown to Miss 
Lium. She told the officers which poster the robber had 
handled and the print was in fact lifted from the 
poster (Exhibits 5, 9-12, Tr. 31, 32). Appellant attempted 
to explain that he had been in the shop two days prior 
to the robbery and had handled the poster then (Tr. 70). 
Again, appellant's credibility is in issue in light of 
the investigating officer's statements that appellant 
denied being in the shop or even knowning which shop they 
were refer=~~J ~~ !Tr. 45, 55, 56). Also, the testimony 
of the fingerprint experts indicating a fingerprint will 
last only thirty-six hours maxi~um (Tr. 39, 60), directly 
contradicts the possibility of appellant's print lasting 
48 hours as appellant claims. Applying the rule in 
Howard, su~, the trial court could reasonably believe 
appellant was in the shop the night of the robbery and 
following Marquez, supra, conclude appellant in fact did 
rob the shop. 
Appellant contends that since no gun and no 
money were found, the prosecution has failed to prove those 
elements of aggravated robbery. 
-1 ()-
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Miss Lium stood facing the appellant no more than 
one foot apart. She said the appellant had an automatic 
pistol stuffed in his pants with the handle clearly 
visible (Tr. 8, 9). She stated she was afraid that the 
appellant might use the gun (Tr. 10, 11). 
Following appellant's argument to its logical 
conclusion, convictions for aggravated robbery could 
easily be circumvented by the robber merely throwing 
the weapon into a nearby lake or canal. The law does not 
require that the actual weapon be found. This Court has 
ruled that the victim's testimony is enough even where no 
gun is found. In State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1977), the victim testified that the defendant had what 
looked like the barrell of a gun protruding from his 
shirt. The victim stated he thought it was a gun, but 
no gun was actually found. This Court upheld the jury's 
verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated robbery in 
that case. 
Furthermore, respondent submits that Miss Lium's 
testimony that the money \vas taken is enough to show 
that element of the offense. As stated in Middlestadt, 
supra, the victim's testimony alone may be enough to 
sustain the conviction, and a fortiorari it is sufficient 
as to this element. 
-11-
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Appellant has presented no evidence to impeach 
Miss Lium's testimony. The only factual inconsistencies 
in her testimony result directly from apoellant's own 
self-serving testimony which is suspect. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution presented evidence to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense 
of aggravated robbery. Miss Lium's unimpeached testimony 
conclusively establishes appellant's guilt. Moreover, 
the physical evidence of the fingerprint and identification 
of the parka and gloves are more than substantial to 
suppor~ the trial court's verdict and corroborate Miss 
Lium's testimony. 
As stated in Middlestadt, supra, the tria} 
court was in a better position to judge the demeanor of 
witnesses and pass on their credibility. Appellant's 
testimony W?S directly contradicted by himself and 
fingerprint experts. Respondent submits the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion, weighed the 
evidence, and found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of aggravated robbery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DOFIUS 
AssistanL Attorn~y General 
Attorneys for R<•c;!'"nclent 
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